The war in Ukraine, although conventional, established the importance of atomic weapons. If Russia did not have specified an arsenal, freed from atomic escalation risks The West would support Ukraine much more. If Ukraine had its own warheads, the Russian Federation would not have attacked it.
Ukrainian atomic weapons were transported to Russia and destroyed. In the photo, beginning the silo where the rocket is stored. June 6, 1994. Wojtek Laski/East News
Let us note a certain correctness – the atomic blackmails of Vladimir Putin and his people appeared all time Russia ran into problem on the front or as the West crossed the next red lines, providing the Ukrainian army with increasingly advanced weapons. And while these threats proved the Kremlin’s powerlessness, they proved to be a rather effective tool. They left a shadow of uncertainty about the determination of Russians, technically capable of striking an atomic blow not only in Ukraine, but besides in NATO members.
Yes, exposed after February 24, 2022, the mediocre condition of the Russian army allowed to uncertainty the advanced efficiency of Russia's atomic arsenal. Only that considering whether half of Russian warheads or only 10% were suitable for usage made no sense. The Federation has 1.5 1000 active loads, and already one, even tactical, would origin considerable damage, and respective or respective explosions would bring disaster on the continent scale. The greats of this planet preferred not to risk, hence (mostly) the self-limiting nature of aid to Kiev.
He would not have risked Putin either if he had to take into account the script of an atomic repost from Ukraine. This view has been present in the public debate over Dnieprem since 2014, erstwhile the first, then limited Russian invasion occurred. It became highly popular, mostly popular, with full-scale war and awareness of the advanced price paid by the Ukrainian state and society.
Flash reaction to a joke
The March 2025 event is crucial in this context. Oleg Gorochowski, a businessman and co-founder of Monobank, announced a atomic drop. This happened after an unfortunate gathering at the White home and an acute exchange of views between Volodymyr Zelenski and Donald Trump, in which the result temporarily suspended American aid to Ukraine. “We cannot depend on the US’s vision,” said Gorochowski. The social reaction was fast – in short time more than 20 million hryvnia were collected (2 million PLN). Soon, however, the banker acknowledged that the action was a gag that he had no real plan to get weapons of mass destruction. Although the funds were collected to acquisition drones for the Ukrainian army, the initiator was accused of mistrusting contributors. The case did not end with formal accusations, but the way it resonated was a clear signal as to how serious Ukrainians take the subject of weaponizing their country in an "atomician". Importantly, reasoning about the effectiveness of the "nuclear policy" is accompanied by mourning for the lost attribute, Ukraine already had a atomic arsenal and gave it up. At least that's what Ukrainians think.
In the fall of 2023 I visited the military airport in Poltava, where there was inactive 1 Tu-160 and 1 Tu-95. As museum facilities, which were wiped out from most of the apparatus, they were spared cassation, but inactive destroyed under the cloud. photograph by Marcin Ogdowski
Exukrain bomber raids
In August 1991, erstwhile the republic declared independence, a more than million russian troops were stationed in its territory. It was the most valuable component of the russian Army, intended for war with the North Atlantic Alliance. In addition to the best tanks, combat vehicles, aircraft or helicopters in the weaponry, he besides had 1.9 1000 strategical and 2.5 1000 tactical atomic warheads. This includes more than 40 Tu-95/Tu-160, bomb carriers and maneuvering missiles.
These are estimates, of course, due to the fact that the Soviets never published accurate data, and any of the heads could have been in transit or dismantling. Anyway, there was adequate of that arsenal to burn the planet down, which became the reason for the diplomatic and economical force of the Russian Federation and, above all, the United States. Washington did not want specified a dangerous weapon to be carried out by a young state in chaos after the dissolution of the USSR. Kiev was forced to issue it, in exchange for safety guarantees offered by Russia, the USA and Britain. We know them as the Budapest Memorandum, signed in the Hungarian capital on 5 December 1994 at the summit of the Organisation for safety and Cooperation in Europe. present we know that it did not safe Kiev's interests.
Photo by Marcin Ogdowski
June 2, 1996 Ukraine has formally ceased to be a atomic power. By that time, she had left Russia for almost a 100 peculiar trains loaded with warheads. For the next six years, as part of a task funded by Americans, rocket silos, rockets, bombers were destroyed. In the fall of 2023 I visited the military airport in Poltava, where there was inactive 1 Tu-160 and 1 Tu-95. As museum facilities, which were wiped out from most of the apparatus, they were spared cassation, but inactive destroyed under the cloud. At the same time – which deserves the designation of cruel perverse destiny – 11 machines donated Moscow, as a settlement of debt for gas supplies, regularly participated in raids on Ukrainian cities. In misfortune, they fired missiles with conventional loads.
Owner without safe access
Let's go back to the early 1990s. The arsenal left by the Soviets gave Ukraine the titular position of the 3rd atomic power. Among modern citizens of this country, the view is that Kiev oversaw all or at least a large condition of the russian Army units equipped with atomic weapons. And that is not actual – most of the troops did not curse allegiance to Ukraine and with time, along with full-time equipment, moved to the Federation area. As for tactical warheads, by May 1992 they were all exported to Russia. Moscow acted rapidly here, not so much for fear of Ukraine, but to avoid the hazard of proliferation (it was common then that tiny heads would hit the black market, to the arsenals of terrorist groups). The transport covered a spectrum of tactical atomic weapons: short-range rocket charges, artillery missiles, bomb and aircraft warheads and anti-shippers. Importantly, it happened before Ukraine created its own control structures. In 1991 the Ukrainian army in the current sense of the word was not, it was formed from the russian remnants, which took another 2 years.
In 1993, Ukraine inactive had quite a few strategical heads – larger, more hard to dismantle and transport – and the atomic infrastructure needed to maintain: warehouses, launchers, silos. But Kiev did not have full supervision over it. Ukraine inherited warheads, rockets and bombers without activation codes – these were located in Moscow (Kazbek system), did not have full documentation and access to atomic weapons procedures, did not control safety systems (for example, PAL, Permissive Action Links, or electronic safety locks). In summary, although the "atomical" were physically located in its territory, the arming and firing systems remained in Russia. Looking for an analogy, you can compare Ukraine to the owner of a warehouse without a key to the 1 inside the safe.
In the fall of 2023 I visited the military airport in Poltava, where there was inactive 1 Tu-160 and 1 Tu-95. As museum facilities, which were wiped out from most of the apparatus, they were spared cassation, but inactive destroyed under the cloud. photograph by Marcin Ogdowski
Could this owner have gotten to the contents of the clipboard? In order to have a real russian arsenal, Ukraine would gotta disarm existing safeguards, make its own atomic command and control system, and take over or build its own warhead maintenance facilities. It was not impossible, but it would require respective years of work, immense money and method support that no 1 wanted to give Kiev. In Ukraine – and beyond – present there is simply a belief that the country had adequate technological and industrial facilities. Yes, strong centres in Kharkov, Dniepra and Kiev were active in the erstwhile republic, but their scope of competences and method capabilities did not include a full cycle of production and modernisation of atomic weapons.
Historical Mistake
Let us add financial issues to this – maintaining atomic arsenal would cost Ukraine tens of billions of dollars a year. Meanwhile, the recently created country was in a terrible economical situation, strangled by hyperinflation and unemployment. For a country that has just created its own institutions, a atomic program would mean an utmost burden. Yet there was inactive global force – not only the US and Russia, but besides Britain and China were pushing Ukraine to quit atomic weapons. The refusal threatened diplomatic isolation and cut off from global financial assistance. Yes, by sanctions, if it were considered that Kiev was breaking the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
W Kiev was besides feared by the Russian military reaction, which would most likely have resulted in a terrible defeat for Ukraine in the early and mid-1990s. At least that's how it was calculated, taking seriously the voices coming from Russia, which russian atomic weapons considered theirs and did not hide that its acquisition by another states would be crossing the red line. For all these reasons, under force and encouragement, the then authorities in Kiev felt that it was better to quit the “units”. “This is simply a historical mistake,” says modern Ukrainians. It is hard to deny them the right to believe that a crucial atomic arsenal would supply them with immunity. But their ideas of lost power are based on false beliefs and ahistoric conclusions.
