The unusual rebellion of Prigozhin – unusual due to the fact that he looked like a dangerous effort to take over and ended up like a blown candle after turning on... Lukashenko – amazed and divided most analysts. Since Sunday they have been trying to explain to their readers and listeners what actually happened. Unfortunately, erstwhile I read them with regret, I find that all the analyses I have had the chance to get acquainted with are powerfully determined by which camp an analyst is in. [1]
And so the "government-American" analysts agree that this demonstrates the weaknesses of Russia as a full and Putin personally in particular. They have rather reasonable arguments for this, for example, that the “musicist” troops (as sometimes called the mercenaries of CzWK Wagner) have easy occupied the office of the territory office in Rostów and another government buildings in that city. besides without peculiar difficulty they reached Russia 200 km from Moscow, where serious defence preparations were conducted (e.g. bridges on the Oka River were planted – the last natural obstacle to Wagner troops).
On the another hand, "alternative pro-Russian" (or "anti-system") analysts erstwhile they recovered from the first shock (most of them were simply silent on Saturday) see in this the lace work of the Russian services which strengthens Putin, allows for the transfer of Wagner's troops to Belarus from close to Kiev and besides revealed Putin's opponents who can now be removed from the power structures. That is the alleged "stand-up", theatre for the usage of enemies in the West and interior enemies.
That is – in short and simplistic – "car weakens, Russia weak" vs. "car strong, Russia strong, everything under control". Unfortunately, sad is the reflection that the ideas or simple desire are stronger than the facts, and analysis replaces the creation of improbable intellectual structures to justify the line. The sadder ones, in the performance of “independent” analysts, are not, I think, paid to sale people crap like the media officers of the main sewage.
I, of course, am not an analyst, nor do I have access to classified and classified information, but I would like to draw attention to certain facts that analysts do not know why they ignore.
The first fact is ‘roots’ Mr Wagner.
The real founder of this formation is Dmitri Utkinwho previously served long years in Specnaz – peculiar commando units subject to GROUP or military intelligence (which has maintained continuity despite “system transformation”). In this formation he served in both wars in Chechnya and served as lieutenant colonel. At the end of the service, he commanded branch number 700 as part of 2nd Guards of the Specnaz Brigade (700th отдельный отряд специального назначения (в/ч 75143)). In 2013, Utkin officially retired to the reserve, but did not engage in any civilian activity only participated in the takeover of Crimea by Russia and later in training militants separating from Ukraine the Donetsk and Luhansk republics. As part of this, he took part in fights in the vicinity of Melitopol – and that is erstwhile the "Wagner Group" appears – called it from the codename or nickname that Utkin utilized at the time. Then there was the improvement of the formation, its formalization as a commercial entity and then its usage in Syria.
Let us add that it is Utkin who is inactive in real command of the branches of the PCWK “Wagner” and he was reportedly the author of the plan in which the loudspeakers of “musicians” approached Moscow 200 km.
Another clue is where the training camps of the CHWK ‘Wagner’ are located, where volunteers registered there (or possibly ‘volunteers’). The main specified facility is located in the camp Молькино (Mołkino) close Krasnodar, which, of course, belongs to the Russian armed forces. Moreover, external protection is provided by the regular Russian army – in order to scope the ‘mother’ of the PCC Wagner, the rightful individual is first legitimized by outside soldiers of the regular army. And so rather a "accident" in the neighbourhood is... the camp of the 10th Specnazu Brigade (в/ч 51532).
Let me point out that there is fundamentally no specified thing as a "ex-military intelligence officer" unless he betrays and turns to the enemy (and not always, due to the fact that there are known cases of false deserters). This and another clues let us to explain logically that CHP Wagner is simply a camouflaged form of Specnaz, 1 way or another subordinate to the GRU.
The second fact is shot down during the “Moscow march” helicopters and... aircraft. Information on this issue is contradictory and incomplete, but it is confirmed that 9 aircraft are shot down in total, including:
- 2 combat helicopters – 1 Mi-35M And 1 Ka-52,
- one transport chopper Mi-8,
- 3 radio-electronic combat helicopters Mi-8 MTPR-1,
- Air Command Point — IL-22M.
These were the biggest losses of military Russian aviation suffered in 1 day in a long time – I have not been certain since planet War II, in any case, during the war in Ukraine the Russian air force never lost so many aircraft at erstwhile (the worst day in May lost 4 pieces). The crews were mostly killed (there were reports that individuals survived) – which leads to bitter comments among the Russians, that in the name of which these airmen sacrificed their lives since no 1 suffered any consequences and now in propaganda it turns out that nothing happened. However, I peculiarly wondered which the aircraft were shot down.
Radio-electronic combat helicopters are utilized to jam communication – communication – of the opponent, as well as jamming satellite navigation signals. What could they be doing here? The question of navigation is alternatively out of the question, due to the fact that Wagner's rebellious troops were just driving M4 motorway for what a simple car map and the usage of road signs is enough. So it had to be about communication – and this was a serious problem for Wagner's commanding officers adequate to decide to usage anti-aircraft missiles to shoot down these helicopters.
But even more interesting is the subject of the IŁ-22M1 aircraft – an air command post.
First of all, it is in relationships where people talk about fallen Russian airmen that are exchanged about a 10-man crew – pilots, mechanics and radio technicians. The problem is that an aircraft – an air command post only makes sense if there are officers on board who command military operations. They are not part of the “aircraft” crew of the aircraft, but are a alternatively crucial group.
He writes about it in detail. Viktor Alksnis, Colonel of the russian Air Force at rest, and at the same time a Russian nationalist:
The most hard problem is to find the number of fatalities as a consequence of Il-22 aircraft being shot down.
Note that this is simply a very different aircraft. It is equipped with peculiar equipment that allows command and control of troops during combat activities, including after the usage of atomic weapons and demolition of ground command stations. It is simply a mobile air command post at front level and a combined group of troops.
In the compartment of the aeroplane there is simply a separate working space and a remainder area for the front commander, under area conditions it is the territory commander. The cab is besides equipped with a command post with all the essential modern equipment, there are operators' workstations for receiving and processing operational information, as well as issuing information and instructions to different structures and units.
In addition, the aircraft has places to remainder and live, essential for long-term combat service. At the same time, working and remainder conditions for staff are very good.
The russian Air Force had 10 specified aircraft. But after the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation had only five, the remainder got to the erstwhile russian republics and rapidly turned into a pile of scrap metallic there. Between 2019 and 2021, work was carried out on the modernization of the outdated 5 air command stations Il-22 to version Il-22M-11. Work on the repair and conversion of aircraft to the IŁ-22M-11 version was to be completed in 2021. I do not know if the aircraft shot down on June 24 was upgraded to variant Il-22M-11. However, I accept that this was the option.
I presume that it was from this aircraft that the general command of the operation was conducted to suppress the rebellion of the CHP Wagner during their attack on Moscow. It is hard to believe the authoritative version that this aircraft was only utilized as a communications relay. It's like sticking nails in a microscope.
The crew of the IŁ-22 old modification, as well as the fresh one, consists of 2 parts. It is an aviation staff that operates an aircraft and an operating group located in a compartment that performs command and control of troops utilizing peculiar equipment.
The operational group besides consists of 2 parts. The first are method specialists who guarantee the operation of peculiar communication and control devices. The second is generals and elder officers who straight control their subordinate troops.
The typical IŁ-18 aircraft crew consisted of 5 people: the commander of the aircraft, the appropriate pilot, the navigator, the radio operator and the onboard mechanics.
The size of the task force in the compartment is unknown to me. Based on individual experience with the operation of Balkan aircraft and Mi-9, Mi-22 and Tu-134 helicopters in the 1980s, I can presume that their number ranged from 10 to 15 people. I don't think any of the military territory commanders are aboard a shot down air command post.
Perhaps the task force was led by a high-ranking general at the level of deputy commander of the military district, and the task force included another generals, as well as officers in the rank of colonel or higher.
On the basis of the above circumstances, I presume that the full number of aircraft and operating group personnel on board IL-22 ranged from 15 to 20 people. They all died.
In total, from the above arguments and calculations, I presume that as a consequence of the demolition of six helicopters and 1 aircraft by Wagner group rebels, 17 to 22 crews were killed. I besides presume that even soldiers in the rank of general may be among the dead.
So much Victor Alksnis, who Your opinions It was based on information obtained thanks to inactive existing contacts in Russia's air force.
Isn't that an interesting thing about this plane - the command post?
Well, yeah.
- in modern times, the claim that an air radio signal repeater was needed for coordination of actions does not hold up – the government had at its disposal not only average military communications (the thing was held in its own territory), not only satellite communications but besides mobile communications, etc., Therefore, why usage a unique command aircraft, 1 of the 5 units at the disposal of the air force at all (some of which are most likely in the process of modernization), as W. Ałksnis points out with his remark on "putting nails with a microscope",
- why should the coordination of the actions of the units to defy the ‘Wagner’ group columns take place from the air? Why could it not be run by normal, "stationary" military wards through which they passed, coordinated from the center in Moscow? Was it feared that they could be occupied – and eliminated – like the Rostov staff over Don? Or was their loyalty feared? specified concerns would explain the usage of an air command post, in explanation unattainable to non-air force rebels.
- even if – then why did this plane approach these columns close adequate to be attacked by a ground-to-air rocket from a portable launcher (they were not complex S300 – S400 – S500-class systems with a large range, but most likely Pancyr up to 40km)? After all, these days, officers on board did not gotta look out the window to be aware of the situation. How did it happen that the rebels knew what to shoot at – possibly individual helped them and informed them that the operation to halt them was being conducted from this peculiar aircraft? I don't think it was announced on FlightRadar24.
And with were the officers actually in charge of the IL-22M1? due to the fact that any organized, serious opposition of the Wagner rebels did not encounter at all on their tour – any helpless militiamen were shown looking at the column crossing or even Panic expansion of the M4 motorway Or putting trucks on it to halt Wagner's column. I don't think these actions were coordinated from the air command post.
Only on the line of the Oka River (known to older Poles from the song from the times rightly passed) so about 200 km from Moscow was organized a defensive line consisting of troops of the “Rossgwardy” and regular army. However, the aircraft operated much further south (or it would not be possible to shoot it down).
There are so 2 possibilities:
- or the mysterious plane had a completely different function than it seems (maybe just... coordinating the actions of rebels and the army?),
- or actually flew as a “repeater” without a command group, which in turn would prove full desperation and panic (we take what is at hand and usage it, no substance that it is valuable and uncommon equipment of another destiny).
Let us add that Wagner's group is in my opinion the GRU's arm, namely the "hard core" of the Russian army. The army – no army – is monolith, there are different clans and groups with different interests that fight each other. This is intertwined with the known rivalry of secret military services (GRU) with civilians (KGB/FSB-SVR) and politics. So it's rather possible that, in fact, any large-based backroom groups in the army decided to make a coup, which would explain why the very long-term regular army did nothing to halt Wagner's troops going to Moscow.
Let us add that many Russians and especially military would support the coup. I think that many military people do not realize why the war in Ukraine is being waged with 1 hand tied behind their backs, utilizing half-measures, without making logical actions compatible with the art of war that could give triumph (of any unusual aspects I've already written). And I am certain that many officers and soldiers of this army hatred the Shojgu – a civilian, a long-time apparatusist who has been given the rank of general leading the civilian defence and has not passed the way of promotion from the lieutenant, fought nowhere and has no military experience.
However, something happened backstage, which caused the plan to be interrupted. We don't know what it was and we most likely won't know – well, possibly in 100 years any historian will dig into any sources, possibly individual from the actors of events will say something old years before he died, etc. We are left with divination of fuzes – and propaganda fairy tales.
I would add that I am not personally convinced by the version that the rebellion was “pretty”. If it were fake it would not be panic, it would not be sharp in the speech of Putin's first speech, there would be no government aircraft fleeing from Moscow (it was abandoned, among others, by presidential IL-96 RA-96022, Tu-214 RA-64520 or utilized by Sergei Lavrov A319 RA-73025) and the announced state of emergency, urging the population to stay in their homes, etc. There would besides be no usage of IL-22M1 aircraft.
But above all, it does not come to my belief that in Russia's culture power is either absolute or there is no power. It cannot be that the Tsar is being challenged by an armed challenge, that he raises rebellion and that they do not endanger the consequences. The rebel was raised to a level where the head of another state, president Lukashenko, would negociate with him. And the results of this mediation were accepted by Putin, who besides thanked Lukashenko for his support. This absolutely does not fit what is meant by “power” in Russia's culture. [2]
In strong Russia, rebels should have been wiped off the face of the earth and leaders should have been killed in conflict or executed after capture. Any kind of grace could only be shown to Wagner's private soldiers in the form of a re-direction to the front in Ukraine. Only then would the image of strong power and strong Tsar hold. Otherwise, the full Russian society sees that power is weak. This is besides seen by those who would like to take over this power or – which is even more dangerous for the state – to take distant from Russia any region or fabrication. They see that it was not much to do and that it would have worked, but – and more importantly – there were no consequences for the rebels.
In any case, in order to realize this better, let's effort to imagine what would happen if specified an action had taken place for Tsar Nicholas I or for Comrade Stalin. The thought that tsar or tow. Stalin would let the rebels go is absurd. To be honest, even in the “democratic” countries of the West, specified action would end very likewise – what do you think would happen to Blackwater if they tried to rally in Washington through the US? Do you think that even Joe Biden would let the president of Mexico negociate with the leader of specified a formation?
This point is absolutely crucial. Various tales about Putin's “thanks” to this checked who supported him, etc., are the curses of reality. The reality, which unfortunately is that the structures of power in Russia are presently weak and the state itself was in effect incapable to respond harshly and decisively. This raises large concerns for the future.
Fears due to the fact that Russia is simply a atomic power – instability in specified a country, the anticipation of any kind of coup or civilian war may rise fears that this weapon will not be utilized or will not get into the incorrect hands. Concerns, due to the fact that this may mean that the opposition of the Russian authorities to the NWO, globalisation and degeneration spread by the West is apparent and at best severely limited.
However, fears besides that our Polish management may recognise that this is the minute erstwhile Poland should directly, militarily integrate itself into conflict due to the fact that Russia is falling apart. Especially since the American lords of our local puppets can encourage them to do so. In this context, a restrained reaction 24.06. erstwhile Morawiecki and Duda stressed that the "internal case of Russia" was a affirmative surprise, which contrasted with the militant statements Dudy was a day early erstwhile at the ambassadors' gathering he was talking about Poland's goal to defeat Russia.
A direct commitment to war with Russia would be highly unreasonable. Russia is even weak for contemporary Poland besides strong to be able to think about defeating it in combat. And it is worth recalling that the 1917 revolution (the anti-Russian western diversion with the judaic “control package”) plunged Russia into much worse chaos, leading to the dissolution of the empire, and inactive a fewer years later stopping the Red Army on the prefields of Warsaw was so hard that we called it “the miracle over the Vistula”. In 1939, and so only 20 years later, the USSR was a military power, as proved by the result of planet War II.
It's worth keeping in mind. Especially in the context of the “surprise” promised by Poland and Lithuania for Ukraine at the NATO Summit on 11 July.
[1] The exception is simply a long analysis of Tomasz Gryguci (known as Mr.Nobody), with which I agree. I do not include a link to it due to the fact that it was presented in a closed group, which is not intended for publishing.
[2] I urge a book in this context Nikolai Starikov entitled “Power” – Historical survey of what power in Russia is.
